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Articles 
DAVID S. CAUDILL* 
The Year of Truman Capote:  
Legal Ethics and In Cold Blood 
[As Capote] screenwriter Dan Futterman has admitted, 
reading In Cold Blood left him with a sense of an absence, an 
awareness “that Capote, who was the most interesting 
character in the book by far, wasn’t there.”
1
 
s filmgoers in 2006 know, Truman Capote’s In Cold 
Blood:  A True Account of a Multiple Murder and Its 
Consequences2 involves two stories.  The first, including the 
subject matter of the book and two earlier films (the 1967 movie 
directed by Richard Brooks and the 1996 television miniseries 
directed by Jonathan Kaplan), not only details the brutal murder 
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1 Mark Kermode, Truman Capote, You’ve Got a Lot to Answer for, GUARDIAN 
UNLIMITED, Jan. 15, 2006, available at http://film.guardian.co.uk/features/ 
featurepages/0,,1686611,00.html. 
2 TRUMAN CAPOTE, IN COLD BLOOD:  A TRUE ACCOUNT OF A MULTIPLE 
MURDER AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (Vintage International 1994) (1965). 
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of a Kansas farm family but comprehensively critiques a murder 
trial.  Even as he claimed to refrain from judgment, Capote’s 
indictments of the prosecutors, the defense attorneys, the judge, 
the jury, and an outdated doctrine of insanity strongly suggest a 
miscarriage of justice.  This alone is reason enough to include In 
Cold Blood in the canon of conventional law and literature 
studies, insofar as the book provides vignettes of potentially 
unethical conduct, possible community bias infecting a trial, and 
seemingly bad law.3 
The other story is about the author himself while he was 
writing In Cold Blood (including his personal life, his research 
practices, and his aesthetic goals) and is the subject of the recent 
films Capote4 and Infamous.5  Each film raises ethical questions 
of immediate interest to “new” journalists and “creative” 
reporters who share in Capote’s heritage or write in the “true 
crime” genre.6  Even if Capote’s account of the Clutter murders 
would have been accurate, his techniques were disturbing: 
 
3 In Cold Blood can also be read as a critique of capital punishment.  See LAW IN 
LITERATURE:  AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF LAW RELATED WORKS 35–36 
(Elizabeth Villiers Gemmette ed., 1998), which does not claim to represent the 
“canon” of law in literature, id. at 1, but which includes an annotation by Teree E. 
Foster on In Cold Blood: 
Truman Capote’s dark non-fiction novel . . . chronicles [the Clutter 
murders] and its effects upon all persons touched by it. 
 . . . . 
 However, the essence of the novel is its depiction of capital 
punishment. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . [Capote] compels us to ask . . . whether execution of even sociopaths 
like Hickock and Smith is any less random and brutal than the crimes for 
which they were executed. 
Id. at 35–36.  Capote believed that capital crimes should be prosecuted by federal 
courts and that “those convicted should be imprisoned in a special Federal prison 
where, conceivably a life sentence could mean, as it does not in State courts, just 
that.”  GEORGE PLIMPTON, TRUMAN CAPOTE:  IN WHICH VARIOUS FRIENDS, 
ENEMIES, ACQUINTANCES, AND DETRACTORS RECALL HIS TURBULENT CAREER 
209 (1997). 
4 CAPOTE (United Artists 2005) (directed by Bennett Miller and based on 
GERALD CLARKE, CAPOTE: A BIOGRAPHY (1988)). 
5 INFAMOUS (Warner Independent Pictures 2006) (directed by Doug McGrath 
and based on PLIMPTON, TRUMAN CAPOTE, supra note 3). 
6 In Cold Blood paved “the way for a string of artfully constructed works which 
attempted to capture the human components of those ‘monsters’ who habitually 
fascinate the public and media.”  Kermode, supra note 1.  Kermode lists, as owing 
“a debt to In Cold Blood,” JOE MCGINNIS, FATAL VISION (1983) (the story of 
convicted murderer Jeffrey MacDonald), EMLYN WILLIAMS, BEYOND BELIEF 
(1968) (regarding the Moors murders), GORDON BURN, SOMEBODY’S HUSBAND, 
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Capote lied to his interview subjects, defiled the corpses of the 
murder victims, arranged for legal representation for two cold-
blooded killers, and may have even fallen in love with one of 
them.  For Capote, the end justified his unscrupulous means, 
and he surely sent a message to some aspiring journalists over 
the years.
7
 
The more illusory ethical conflict in the films, however, concerns 
the writing of Capote’s “true account.”  As biographer Kenneth 
Reed explains, creative reportage involves setting “down a 
continuum of factual information in such a way that it carries a 
fictive quality”; the author imposes artistic order, structure, and 
coherence on “a body of information.”8  However, just as 
Capote seemed to value the completion of his book more than 
the lives of its subjects,9 he seems to have valued artistic 
structure over journalistic accuracy.  As John Richardson 
(biographer of Picasso) charged:  “Truman had absolutely no 
respect for the truth.  He felt that as a fiction writer he had 
license to say whatever came into his head as long as it had a 
surprising point or shape to it, or an unexpected twist to its 
tail.”10  Capote had “wanted to write . . . a nonfiction novel–a 
book that would read exactly like a novel except that every word 
of it would be absolutely true.”11  Though he claimed to have 
succeeded, many of his interviewees said he did not.12 
 
SOMEBODY’S SON (1985) (about the Yorkshire Ripper case), and BRIAN MASTERS, 
KILLING FOR COMPANY:  THE CASE OF DENNIS NILSEN (1985) (based on the 
prison journals of serial murderer Nilson). 
7 Peter Klein, Film “Capote” Raises Disturbing Ethical Questions, JOURNALISM 
ETHICS FOR THE GLOBAL CITIZEN, Jan. 2006, http://www.journalismethics.ca/ 
book_reviews/.  Klein mentions Judith Miller’s inaccurate New York Times stories 
about Iraq’s weapons capabilities, and discredited journalists Jayson Blair and 
Stephen Glass, as recent examples of journalistic ambition–the film Capote 
represents “the beginning of the end, the top of that slippery slope down which the 
profession of journalism has slid.”  Id. 
8 KENNETH T. REED, TRUMAN CAPOTE 94 (1981). 
9 The film Capote portrays the author as alternatively arranging for delay of the 
defendants’ hanging in order to get his story, and later hoping that the execution 
happens quickly to provide a needed, spectacular ending to his book.  CAPOTE 
(United Artists 2005). 
10 See PLIMPTON, TRUMAN CAPOTE, supra note 3, at 308 (interview with John 
Richardson). 
11 LAWRENCE GROBEL, CONVERSATIONS WITH CAPOTE 112 (1985). 
12 Compare PLIMPTON, TRUMAN CAPOTE, supra note 3, at 207 (Capote claimed 
that “all of [In Cold Blood] is reconstructed from the evidence of witnesses”), with 
id. at 175 (according to KBI Agent Nye “it . . . was a fiction book”), and id. at 222 
(“This business of a new art form–‘nonfiction novel’–is a bunch of garbage,” said 
Garden City Prosecutor Duane West.). 
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The risks of nonfiction storytelling–of imposing aesthetic 
structure on information–present challenges not only to New 
Journalists, but also to lawyers and judges.  In Cold Blood 
therefore becomes relevant for another aspect of law and 
literature studies (in addition to its conventional law-in-
literature aspect), namely law as literature.  Every law student 
learns early in law school that facts, in lawyers’ arguments and 
judicial opinions, can be selected and manipulated, and are as 
interpretable and unstable as legal doctrine.  This phenomenon 
raises the question of the ethical limitations on legal storytelling. 
The purpose of this study is to use Capote’s In Cold Blood as 
a point of reflection on several ethical obligations of lawyers.  In 
Part I, I focus on Capote’s accounts of the prosecution’s use of 
expert witnesses, and his suggestion that defense counsel were 
(i) unable or unwilling to deal with their personal conflicts of 
interest and (ii) incompetent, the latter of which became the 
subject of disciplinary investigations and federal court review.  In 
terms of the duties of an advocate, Capote sees the prosecution 
as going too far, and the defense as failing to go far enough.  In 
Part II, I turn to the ethical limitations on lawyers as storytellers, 
focusing on opening and closing arguments at trial.  While it 
would seem to be unethical to fail to tell a client’s story as 
dramatically as possible, there is always a risk of turning fact into 
fiction.  I conclude in Part III that Capote’s nonfiction novel, and 
the circumstances surrounding its writing, provide valuable 
ethical insights for students and practitioners concerning the 
goals and limits of trial advocacy. 
I 
IN COLD BLOOD AND ITS LAWYERS 
Capote did not claim, as I do, that In Cold Blood is a critique 
of law. 
Capote himself did not apparently think of In Cold Blood as 
espousing a thesis or message.  He told Perry Smith that [he 
had no] . . . “moral reasons worthy of calling them such–it was 
just that I had a strictly aesthetic theory about creating a book 
which would result in a work of art.”
13
 
 
13 REED, supra note 8, at 115 (quoting Capote in an interview with L. Nichols, 
“Mr. Capote,” NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW, Aug. 22, 1965, at 39). 
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Capote conceded that he felt “moved” by the circumstances in 
Kansas, but he also felt “detached” in his narration.14  “[F]or the 
nonfiction-novel to be entirely successful,” Capote explained, 
“the author should not appear in the work.”15  Capote 
biographer Kenneth Reed thought it “significant that Capote at 
no time renders a judgment about the criminals,” so that a 
reader might make his or her own judgment without interference 
by the author.16  One might ask, however, whether such 
detachment was achieved (or is even possible), given Capote’s 
representation of the accused “Hickock and Smith as moral 
perversions of decent men brought about by the poverty, 
violence, and ill-luck that reached back for at least one 
generation.”17  Nevertheless, Capote claimed that one reason a 
nonfiction novel is harder to write than a conventional novel is 
that he “had to get away from [his] own particular vision of the 
world.”18 
Even if Capote managed in some degree to reserve judgment 
on the Clutter murder defendants, his disdain for the legal 
system is not hidden.  Capote once remarked:  “The only person 
at the moment on the [U.S.] Supreme Court whose grave I 
wouldn’t spit on is Brennan.  The rest of them, I would spit on 
their graves.  Except the lady [O’Connor].  She hasn’t been there 
long enough . . . .”19  In his account of the Clutter murder trial, 
Capote was unimpressed with the trial judge (who allowed the 
prosecutors to get away with questionable strategies, discussed 
below),20 the jurors,21 and the insanity defense in Kansas, which 
did not take account of the rapid maturation of the field of 
 
14 Id. at 116 (quoting from Haskel Frankel, The Story of an American Tragedy, 
SATURDAY REVIEW, Jan. 22, 1966, at 36 (interview of Capote)). 
15 George Plimpton, The Story Behind a Nonfiction Novel, N.Y. TIMES BOOK 
REVIEW, Jan. 16, 1966, at 2, 38. 
16 REED, supra note 8, at 107. 
17 Id.  Capote showed it is “possible to view the Clutter murders as the logical 
outcome of sociological and psychological forces that had gained gradual 
momentum over the years.”  Id. 
18 See MARC WEINGARTEN, THE GANG THAT WOULDN’T WRITE STRAIGHT:  
WOLFE, THOMPSON, DIDION, AND THE NEW JOURNALISM REVOLUTION 33 
(2006). 
19 GROBEL, supra note 11, at 119. 
20 See CAPOTE, supra note 2, at 266–68 (Judge Tate did not allow psychiatric 
evaluations of the defendants). 
21 See id. at 303 (“One juror . . .  sat with drugged eyes and jaws so utterly ajar 
bees could have buzzed in and out.”). 
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psychiatry.22  Moreover, Capote suggests that the prosecutors 
were too zealous, and defense counsel not zealous enough, to 
ensure that the truth about the Clutter murders would come to 
light. 
A.  Prosecutors and Experts 
 A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice 
and not simply that of an advocate.  This responsibility carries 
with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded 
procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of 
sufficient evidence.  Precisely how far the prosecutor is 
required to go in this direction is a matter of debate . . . .
23
 
After the arrest of defendants Perry Smith and Richard 
Hickock, who could not afford to hire counsel, Judge Roland H. 
Tate appointed Harrison Smith to represent Hickock and Arthur 
Fleming to represent Perry Smith.24  Soon after the defendants’ 
arraignment in Garden City, Kansas, defense counsel moved to 
urge the court to send the defendants to the state mental 
institution in Larned, Kansas, for a comprehensive psychiatric 
assessment of their sanity and their capacity “to comprehend 
their position and aid in their defense.”25  Harrison Smith had 
visited the facility and conferred with some of its staff, and he 
argued that there were “no qualified psychiatrists in our own 
community. . . . Larned . . . [has] doctors trained to make serious 
psychiatric evaluations. . . . [B]eing a state institution it won’t 
cost the county a nickel.”26 
Logan Green, appointed as special assistant to prosecutor 
Duane West, opposed the motion: 
[He was] certain that “temporary insanity” was the defense his 
antagonists would attempt to sustain . . . [and he was afraid] 
that the ultimate outcome of the proposal would be, as he 
predicted in private conversation, the appearance on the 
witness stand of a “pack of head-healers” sympathetic to the 
defendants (“Those fellows, they’re always crying over the 
killers.  Never a thought for the victims”).
27
 
 
22 See id. at 302. 
23 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2002, as amended, 2003). 
24 CAPOTE, supra note 2, at 257. 
25 Id. at 266 (quoting one of the appointed defense attorneys). 
26 Id. at 267 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting defense attorney 
Harrison Smith). 
27 Id. (quoting Logan Green). 
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Green pointed out that under the M’Naghten rule in Kansas, “if 
the accused knew the nature of his act, and knew it was wrong, 
then he is mentally competent.”28  Moreover, he argued that: 
[T]here was nothing in the Kansas statutes indicating that the 
physicians chosen to determine a defendant’s mental condition 
must be of any particular qualification:  “Just plain doctors.  
Medical doctors in general practice.  That’s all the law 
requires. . . . It’s no great job to find whether a man is insane or 
an idiot or an imbecile . . . It is entirely unnecessary, a waste of 
time to send the defendants to Larned.”
29
 
Defense counsel Smith, in rebuttal, argued that psychiatry had 
“matured rapidly in the past twenty years,” and that “we have a 
golden opportunity to face up to the new concepts in this field.”30  
Judge Tate, in response, merely appointed “a commission of 
three Garden City doctors and direct[ed] them to pronounce a 
verdict upon the mental capacities of the prisoners.  (In due 
course the medical trio met the accused and, after an hour or so 
of conversational prying, announced that neither man suffered 
from any mental disorder.”31  Harrison Smith, in defeat, 
arranged for Dr. W. Mitchell Jones (from Larned State 
Hospital) to meet with the defendants and testify if needed.32 
At the defendants’ trial, Dr. Jones was called as an expert, and 
Harrison Smith (following the M’Naghten Rule) asked if he had 
an opinion as to whether Hickock knew right from wrong at the 
time of the crime:33 
 
28 Id. 
29 Id. (ellipsis in original) (quoting prosecutor Green).  For a discussion of the 
M’Naghten Rule in Kansas at the time of the Clutter murders, see State v. Boan, 686 
P.2d 160, 167 (Kan. 1984) (discussing two aspects of the M’Naghten Rule:  a 
defendant is not criminally responsible if the defendant did not know (1) the nature 
and quality of the act, or (2) did not know “right from wrong with respect to the 
act”).  Kansas abolished the insanity defense in 1996, but evidence of mental 
disorder can still be introduced to disprove criminal intent.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-
3220 (1995); see generally Randy Borum & Solomon M. Fulero, Empirical Research 
on the Insanity Defense and Attempted Reforms:  Evidence Toward Informed Policy, 
23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 117, 127–31 (1999). 
30 CAPOTE, supra note 2, at 268 (quoting Smith) (Smith also argued that the 
“federal courts are beginning to keep in tune with this science as related to people 
charged with criminal offenses.”). 
31 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
32 Id. (Jones was “exceptionally competent; . . . a sophisticated specialist in 
criminal psychology and the criminally insane.”). 
33 Id. at 293. 
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 “I think that within the usual definitions, Mr. Hickock did 
know right from wrong.” 
 Confined as he was by the M’Naghten Rule (“the usual 
definitions”), a formula quite color-blind to any gradations       
. . . , Dr. Jones was impotent to answer otherwise. . . . 
Hickock’s attorney . . . hopelessly asked, “Can you qualify that 
answer?” 
 It was hopeless because . . . the prosecution was entitled to 
object–and did, citing the fact that Kansas law allowed 
nothing more than a yes or no reply . . . . 
34
 
Dr. Jones would have testified, Capote reports, that Hickock 
may have organic brain damage (from a serious head injury), 
and that tests should be done to determine whether such damage 
“might have substantially influenced his behavior . . . at the time 
of the crime.”35  Later in the trial, when Arthur Fleming called 
Dr. Jones to testify with respect to Perry Smith, Jones stated he 
had no opinion.36  Fleming then said, “[y]ou may state to the jury 
why you have no opinion,” but Green objected:  “The man has 
no opinion, and that’s it.”37  Again, Capote explains that Dr. 
Jones would have testified that while more extensive evaluation 
would be necessary, Perry Smith seemed to be a paranoid 
schizophrenic.38 
In terms of legal ethics, any flaws in Kansas doctrine of 
insanity cannot be blamed on Logan Green.  The only ethical 
question implied in Capote’s account is whether the 
prosecution’s handling of the insanity defense was somehow 
inappropriate.  However, the special responsibilities of a 
prosecutor do not appear to have been neglected:  the charge 
was supported by probable cause, the defendants had counsel 
(and neither their initial waivers of counsel nor their waivers of a 
preliminary hearing had been sought by the prosecution), and no 
mitigating evidence was withheld from the defense.39  These 
 
34 Id. at 294. 
35 Id. at 294–95. 
36 Id. at 296. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 298 (noting that Dr. Joseph Satten, a “widely respected veteran in the 
field of forensic psychiatry” on the staff of the Menniger Clinic in Topeka, 
consulted with Jones “and endorsed his evaluations of Hickock and Smith”). 
39 See, for example, MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2002, as 
amended, 2003), which provides that: 
 The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: 
(a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not 
supported by probable cause; 
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matters were addressed in federal habeas corpus proceedings 
following the conviction of the defendants.40  On appeal from the 
district court’s denial of the petitions, the appellate court ruled: 
[After their arrest,] each petitioner was fully advised of his 
rights, including the right of representation by counsel . . . . 
 . . . [Their] confessions were . . . voluntary . . . .  They were 
advised by the judge that they were entitled to a preliminary 
hearing . . . . [S]uch hearing was waived.
41
 
As to the prosecutor’s opposition to the request that the 
defendants undergo psychiatric examinations at Larned, the 
court noted that the defendants were examined “by a panel of 3 
doctors as provided for by Kansas Statute.”42  Finally, the court 
observed: 
There was no substantial evidence then, and none has been 
produced since the trial, to substantiate a defense of insanity.  
The attempt to establish insanity as a defense because of 
serious injuries in accidents years before, and headaches and 
occasional fainting spells of Hickock was like grasping at the 
proverbial straw.
43
 
Capote, in his account of the trial, includes evidence of insanity 
that did not make it into the trial record because of the 
limitations of the M’Naghten Rule,44 but his suggestion of 
injustice does not seem to implicate the prosecutor’s special 
ethical responsibilities.45 
Capote also implies, however, that because Logan Green 
“feared” the prospect of defense experts and “predicted” their 
sympathetic testimony, Green knew that the three local 
 
(b) make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused . . . has been 
given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel; 
(c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of 
important pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing; 
(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence . . . known to 
the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the 
offense . . . . 
40 CAPOTE, supra note 2, at 327. 
41 Hickock v. Crouse (Hickock IV), 334 F.2d 95, 97–98 (10th Cir. 1964) (footnote 
omitted) (consolidated with Smith v. Crouse). 
42 Id. at 99–100 n.7 (referring to KAN. GEN STAT. § 62-1531). 
43 Id. at 99. 
44 See CAPOTE, supra note 2, at 294–95 (regarding Hickock’s severe character 
disorder); id. at 296–302 (suggesting that Perry Smith may have lapsed into a 
dreamlike dissociative trance or a mental eclipse when he attacked Mr. Clutter). 
45 See id. at 267–68. 
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physicians who determined the defendants’ sanity were wrong.46  
ABA Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) provides that a lawyer cannot 
knowingly “offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.”47  
However, this is a notoriously low standard for policing bad 
evidence, because “[a] lawyer’s reasonable belief that evidence is 
false does not preclude its presentation to the trier of fact.”48  
Nevertheless, a “lawyer’s knowledge that evidence is false . . . 
can be inferred from the circumstances,” and a “lawyer cannot 
ignore an obvious falsehood.”49  But if Green genuinely believed 
that “[i]t’s no great job to find whether a man is insane,” and 
that it would have been a “waste of time” to engage in 
comprehensive psychiatric examinations of the defendants,50 
then he would not have known, even if he reasonably believed, 
that the defendants were insane.  We simply do not require 
attorneys to know, in a battle of medical experts, which 
physician or psychiatrist is telling the truth.51  Moreover, the 
dismissive language in the habeas corpus appeal (to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit), with respect to the 
insanity plea, did not suggest any prosecutorial misconduct.52 
B.  Defense Counsel and Fair Trials 
Everett Steerman, Chairman of the Legal Aid Committee of 
the Kansas State Bar Association, was disturbed by . . . 
allegations . . . that [the defendants] had not had a fair trial. . . . 
 . . . [The defendants complained that their] two defense 
attorneys, Arthur Fleming and Harrison Smith, whose 
“incompetence and inadequacy” were the chief cause of [their 
convictions, had offered] no real defense . . . and this lack of 
 
46 See id. at 267. 
47 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2002, as amended, 2003). 
48 Id. cmt. 8. 
49 Id. 
50 CAPOTE, supra note 2, at 267. 
51 See generally David S. Caudill, Advocacy, Witnesses, and the Limits of Scientific 
Knowledge:  Is There an Ethical Duty to Evaluate Your Expert’s Testimony?, 39 
IDAHO L. REV. 341, 343–48 (2003).  “Even scientists disagree about the validity of 
many hypotheses.  Thus, it hardly makes sense to require that lawyers make 
evaluations of scientific validity, or to assume that lawyers know when a hypothesis 
is ‘true.’”  Id. at 348. 
52 See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.  The court also observed:  “The 
defendants did not testify and their defense was limited to a report of a psychiatrist 
who had examined them, and who stated that Hickock knew right from wrong, but 
he had no opinion as to Smith.”  Hickock IV, 334 F.2d 95, 99 (10th Cir. 1964). 
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effort . . . had been deliberate–an act of collusion between the 
defense and the prosecution.
53
 
The Kansas Supreme Court, on July 8, 1961, affirmed the 
judgments rendered and death sentences imposed on the 
defendants.54  Fleming was Perry Smith’s attorney on the joint 
appeal from the verdicts of guilt, while Hickock was appointed 
new counsel because Harrison Smith became Finney County 
Attorney in January 1961.55  Claims of error included the refusal 
to appoint a psychiatrist to the commission examining the 
defendants, failure to recognize the claims of temporary insanity, 
setting the trial date just after the Clutter estate auction, and 
failure to grant a change of venue (which had not been 
requested).56  After the convictions were affirmed, motions for 
rehearing were filed, but the Kansas Supreme Court 
“immediately . . . began to receive letters from the petitioners 
complaining about the court-appointed counsel.  Soon the court 
was informed that counsel had been discharged.  In a short time 
petitioners were writing to various legal aid groups in Kansas 
seeking counsel.”57 
The Wichita Bar Association legal aid committee asked 
attorney Russell Shultz to investigate the situation, and Shultz 
asked for a delay in the disposal of the motion for rehearing, 
which the court granted while requesting a copy of his report 
when completed.58  The report disturbed the court, and after 
Schultz was appointed to bring habeas proceedings, retired 
Justice Thiele was appointed as a commissioner to take evidence 
and produce another report.59  The latter report was adopted by 
the Kansas Supreme Court in its opinion denying the writ.60  
Shultz was recognized for giving his time to represent the 
petitioners, but his charges that appointed counsel were 
incompetent and their representation inadequate (for failing to 
meet enough with the defendants, to seek a change of venue, to 
 
53 CAPOTE, supra note 2, at 325–26. 
54 State v. Hickock (Hickock I), 363 P.2d 541 (Kan. 1961), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 
544 (1963). 
55 Hickock v. Hand (Hickock II), 373 P.2d 206, 213 (Kan. 1962). 
56 Hickock I, 363 P.2d at 546–49. 
57 Hickock II, 373 P.2d at 208. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 See id. at 208–16. 
306 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86, 295 
seek separate trials, to object to certain jurors, and to introduce 
evidence) were rejected.61 
Just before the hearing on the writ of habeas corpus in the 
Kansas Supreme Court, Perry Smith criticized Shultz and moved 
to have new counsel (namely a penitentiary inmate, who was 
rejected for not being a member of the bar).62  Capote was also, 
though somewhat guardedly, critical of Shultz.63 
 It would appear that Shultz’s investigation was rather one-
sided, since it consisted of little more than an interview with 
Smith and Hickock, from which the lawyer emerged with 
crusading phrases for the press:  “The question is this–do 
poor, plainly guilty defendants have a right to a complete 
defense?  I do not believe that the State of Kansas would be 
either greatly or for long harmed by the death of these 
appellants.  But I do not believe it could ever recover from the 
death of due process.”
64
 
In the commission hearing before retired Justice Thiele, Shultz 
emphasized the failure to request a change of venue,65 and 
suggested that “because of community pressure, Fleming and 
Smith had deliberately neglected their duties”66 by failing to 
meet sufficiently with their clients, by waiving a preliminary 
hearing (the attorneys, however, had not yet been appointed), by 
making damaging statements to the press concerning the 
defendant’s guilt (Harrison Smith denied the newspaper quotes), 
and by “failing to prepare a proper defense.”67 
After the state’s denial of the defendants’ writs of habeas 
corpus, Hickock’s new counsel Joseph Jenkins brought a petition 
for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court (denied in 
February 1963),68 and also (together with Perry Smith’s new 
counsel, Robert Bingham) habeas proceedings in the U.S. 
District Court for Kansas.69  The habeas petitions were denied, 
and on appeal to the Tenth Circuit, those denials were affirmed: 
 
61 See id. 
62 Id. at 208. 
63 See CAPOTE, supra note 2, at 326–27. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 328 (Arthur Fleming responded that he felt the opposition to the death 
penalty by some local ministers might make many jurors “inclined to be lenient.”). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 328–29. 
68 See Hickock v. Crouse (Hickock III), 372 U.S. 924 (1963). 
69 See Hickock IV, 344 F.2d at 95, 96 (10th Cir. 1964) (the defendants’ actions 
were consolidated).  Jenkins and Bingham were appointed by the U.S. District 
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[Jenkins and Bingham] have prosecuted [their] petitions with 
commendable vigor.  It is quite obvious [that] . . . the present 
attorneys are convinced that due to local prejudice and 
pressure the appointed attorneys . . . during the trial did little 
or nothing to protect [the defendants’] rights. . . . We think, 
however, that these attorneys . . . have lost sight of the 
problems which confronted attorneys Smith and Fleming . . . . 
[E]ach petitioner had made a full [and voluntary] confession     
. . . . Under these circumstances, they would have been justified 
in advising that petitioners enter pleas of guilty and throw 
themselves on the mercy of the court.
70
 
Good-faith representation, the court continued, “does not 
contemplate that miracles will be performed,”71 and the 
decisions not to request a change of venue, not to object during a 
trial, and not to “resist the introduction of the confession in 
evidence” do not necessarily suggest incompetence.72  On appeal 
from the Tenth Circuit, the defendants’ petitions for writs of 
certiorari and for rehearing were denied.73 
The requirement that lawyers provide competent 
representation is ambiguous enough to support the various 
courts’ and the commission’s conclusions that Harrison Smith 
and Arthur Fleming provided an adequate defense.74  Harrison 
Smith had twenty-four years of experience, and Fleming about 
forty, in their Kansas law practices.75  Capote points out, 
however, that Shultz’s “principal objective,” in asking these 
attorneys why they did not request a change of venue, was “to 
discredit them and prove that they had not supplied their clients 
with the minimum protection.”76  But they “withstood the 
onslaught in good style, particularly Fleming,” who explained 
why he had not done so.77  Even the failure to demand separate 
trials was explainable (whoever was tried first might become a 
witness against the other), and the failure to demand a record of 
 
Court in response to letters from the defendants after state remedies had been 
exhausted.  Id. at 99. 
70 Id. at 99–100. 
71 Id. at 101. 
72 Id. at 100–02. 
73 Hickock v. Crouse (Hickock V), 379 U.S. 982 (1965) (cert. denied), reh’g 
denied, 380 U.S. 928 (1965). 
74 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002, as amended, 2003). 
75 Hickock IV, 334 F.2d at 98. 
76 See CAPOTE, supra note 2, at 328. 
77 Id.  (Fleming felt there was some aversion to capital punishment in the 
community, more “than perhaps in other parts of the state.”). 
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voir dire was not prejudicial because “all of the jurors who 
served at the trial” were called as witnesses at the commission 
hearing.78  Seeming incompetence was never translated into 
actual incompetence despite a great deal of scrutiny. 
Although the term was never used in Capote’s account or in 
the various proceedings that considered the fairness of the 
murder trial, there was also a charge of conflict of interest 
brought against Fleming and Smith.79  Rule 1.7 of the ABA 
Model Rules provides that a lawyer shall not represent a client if 
“there is a significant risk that the representation . . . will be 
materially limited . . . by a personal interest of the lawyer.”80  
There is an exception if “the lawyer reasonably believes that the 
lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent 
representation to [the] affected client,” and the affected “client 
gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.”81  Capote writes 
that underlying all of Shultz’s charges, including the failure to 
consult with the defendants sufficiently, making damaging 
remarks to “newsmen,” and “failing to prepare a proper 
defense,” was “the implication that because of community 
pressure, Fleming and Smith had deliberately neglected their 
duties.”82  And Jenkins and Bingham, in their federal habeas 
proceedings, were convinced that: 
[D]ue to local prejudice and pressure the appointed attorneys 
representing the petitioners prior to and during the trial did 
little or nothing to protect their rights.  As a result, they 
contend the petitioners did not have a constitutionally fair 
trial, and in addition that the defense offered [by appointed 
counsel] was a reflection upon the integrity of the Kansas     
bar . . . .83 
Both Fleming and Harrison Smith had resisted their 
appointments, and Harrison Smith even said he doubted that 
doing his best would “make me too popular around here,” but 
both felt obligated to serve.84  Whether they bowed to 
community pressure is left for the reader of In Cold Blood, and 
of the various hearings on the fairness of the trial, to decide.  
 
78 Hickock II, 373 P.2d 206, 212 (Kan. 1962). 
79 See infra notes 82–84 and accompanying text. 
80 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2002, as amended, 2003). 
81 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(1), (4). 
82 See CAPOTE, supra note 2, at 328–29. 
83 Hickock IV, 334 F.2d 95, 99 (10th Cir. 1964). 
84 CAPOTE, supra note 2, at 257 (quoting Harrison Smith). 
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While Hickock experienced a “hostile atmosphere” in Garden 
City, Judge Tate testified after the trial: 
It is my opinion that the attitude toward [the defendants] was 
that of anyone else charged with a criminal offense–that they 
should be tried as the law provides; that if they were guilty 
they should be convicted; that they should be given the same 
fair treatment as any other person.  There was no prejudice 
against them because they were accused of crime.
85
 
That seemingly Pollyanna-ish assessment undoubtedly helped 
the “imperiled” careers of Judge Tate as well as Arthur Fleming 
and Harrison Smith “because of the apparent credit the Bar 
Association bestowed upon” the allegations of the defendants.86 
Finally, Capote’s account of the challenges faced by Fleming 
and Smith includes Shultz’s question to Harrison Smith 
concerning statements to the press:  “Are you aware that a 
reporter, Ron Kull of the Topeka Daily Capital, quoted you, on 
the second day of the trial, as saying there was no doubt of Mr. 
Hickock’s guilt, but that you were concerned only with obtaining 
life imprisonment rather than the death penalty?”87  Rule 3.6(a) 
of the ABA Model Rules prohibits any “extrajudicial statement 
that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be 
disseminated . . . and will have a substantial likelihood of 
materially prejudicing” a trial in the matter.88  “Any opinion as 
to the guilt or innocence of a defendant . . . in a criminal case” is 
identified in the comments to Rule 3.6 as “more likely than not 
to have a material prejudicial effect,” so there is little doubt as to 
the impropriety of such a statement.89  Harrison Smith, however, 
denied making the statement:  “If I was quoted as saying that it 
was incorrect.”90 
While Capote does not focus on the rules of professional 
conduct in his account, In Cold Blood easily functions as a point 
of reflection on the ethics of lawyering.  Its vignettes of attorneys 
in action are especially relevant because of their recency and 
actuality in Capote’s “true account.”  However, it is the status of 
Capote’s account as “truthful” that suggests another reason to 
 
85 Id. at 328 (quoting Judge Tate). 
86 Id. at 327. 
87 Id. at 329 (quoting Russell Schultz) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
88 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) (2002, as amended, 2003). 
89 Id. cmt. 5. 
90 See CAPOTE, supra note 2, at 329 (quoting Harrison Smith). 
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include In Cold Blood in the canon of law and literature studies.  
As persuasive storytellers bound by the obligation to tell the 
truth in a trial,91 lawyers risk making the same errors of which 
Capote is accused. 
II 
LAWYERS AS STORYTELLERS 
A.  Fact, Fiction, Faction 
The decision [to write In Cold Blood] was based on a theory 
I’ve harbored since I first began to write professionally . . . . It 
seemed to me that journalism, reportage, could be forced to 
yield a serious new art form:  the “nonfiction novel,” as I 
thought of it.  Several admirable reporters–Rebecca West for 
one, Joseph Mitchell and Lillian Ross–have shown the 
possibilities of narrative reportage . . . .
92
 
The substantial literature concerning Capote’s role in 
creating, sustaining, or even giving a bad name to the various 
movements termed narrative reportage, New Journalism, and 
creative or literary journalism is beyond the scope of this article.  
However, some brief background and a few comparisons help 
illuminate the ethical controversies that followed the alleged 
invention of the “nonfiction novel.”  Capote mentions Rebecca 
West, who admired In Cold Blood as a “grave and reverend 
book,”93 and whose own work included crime and trials 
reportage.94  The similarities of In Cold Blood with, for example, 
West’s report of a brutal “torso murder” in England (entitled 
Mr. Setty and Mr. Hume), are apparent.95  While West’s fiction 
has been criticized (“only one [of her nine novels is] worth 
reading today”),96 her journalistic art is considered superb.  Her 
 
91 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a) (“A lawyer shall not knowingly 
. . . make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal . . . .”). 
92 PLIMPTON, TRUMAN CAPOTE, supra note 3, at 197 (quoting Capote in an 
interview). 
93 Rebecca West, A Grave and Reverend Book, HARPER’S MAGAZINE, Feb. 
1966, at 108, 114 (review of In Cold Blood). 
94 See REBECCA WEST, THE MEANING OF TREASON (Viking Press 1947) (1945); 
REBECCA WEST, A TRAIN OF POWDER (1955) (including a three-part essay on the 
Nuremburg trials, and essays on two murder trials and an espionage trial). 
95 See Rebecca West, Mr. Setty and Mr. Hume, in A TRAIN OF POWDER, supra 
note 94, at 165–230. 
96 Pearl K. Bell, Duchess of Letters, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 22, 1985, at 33 
(book review of REBECCA WEST, THIS REAL NIGHT (1984)). 
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abundant strength as a novelist “to tell an absorbing story and to 
portray the intricacies of human character . . . flowered in her 
journalism . . . [but] not in her novels.”97  Perhaps her “art 
needed the steel scaffolding of facts on which to build the unique 
structure of narrative and ideas she fills with human beings who 
convince us in every word and look that this was how they were, 
and not otherwise.”98 
Thus her “ruthlessly observant” account of a murder case in 
Mr. Setty and Mr. Hume is “packed with unforgettable sketches 
of the people she encountered in her slow retracing of what 
actually happened.”99  Even West, however, as Capote would 
later be, was accused of lacking “the kind of truth which is finally 
supplied only by simple warmth and compassion–the wall of 
her superior powers would seem to rise between Miss West and 
these suffering human beings.”100  Notwithstanding the 
similarities between Capote and West, and her admiration of In 
Cold Blood, Capote dismissed West as “always a good reporter” 
but “never really using the form of creative reportage because 
the form, by necessity, demands that the writer be completely in 
control of fictional techniques–which means that, to be a good 
creative reporter, you have to be a very good fiction writer.”101  
Those “fiction” skills, however, would haunt Capote when he 
was later accused of blending fact and fiction, criticism of which 
is discussed in detail below. 
Another helpful comparison is the New Journalism of Tom 
Wolfe, who included Capote in his anthology of New 
Journalists.102  Combining “the skills and stamina of an ace 
 
97 Id. 
98 Id. (quoting Mollie Panter-Downes).  “[N]owhere could she have found a 
better locus for her gifts than in a court of law.  Her fondness for windy generalities 
and hortatory moralism was kept in check by the slow day-to-day unwinding of the 
legal process of justice.”  Id. at 35. 
99 Id. 
100 Diana Trilling, A Symbol of Reason, N.Y. TIMES, March 20, 1955, at 3 
(reviewing A Train of Powder).  Capote was accused of “winning the friendship” of 
Smith and Hickock, “and then failing to help them.”  TOM GOLDSTEIN, THE NEWS 
AT ANY COST:  HOW JOURNALISTS COMPROMISE THEIR ETHICS TO SHAPE THE 
NEWS 27 (1985) (citing Kenneth Tynan, Weekend Review, SUNDAY OBSERVER, 
March 13, 1966, at 1 (review of In Cold Blood)).  Capote did “less than he might 
have done to save them.”  Id. at 28. 
101 Plimpton, The Story Behind a Nonfiction Novel, supra note 15, at 2 (interview 
with Capote). 
102 TOM WOLFE, THE NEW JOURNALISM 116–26 (1973).  Part I of The New 
Journalism is a three-part essay by Tom Wolfe entitled The New Journalism, id. at 
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reporter with the techniques of fiction,”103 Tom Wolfe and his 
fellow New Journalists wrote “journalism that would . . . read 
like a novel.”104  Significantly, when asked about New 
Journalism, Capote distanced himself from “Tom Wolfe, and 
that crowd,” and claimed that: 
[T]hey have nothing to do with creative journalism–in the 
sense that I use the term–because neither [James Breslin nor 
Tom Wolfe], nor any of that school of reporting, have the 
proper fictional technical equipment.  It’s useless for a writer 
whose talent is essentially journalistic to attempt creative 
reportage, because it simply won’t work.
105
 
Wolfe, on the other hand, closely aligns New Journalism with the 
literary devices of scene-by-scene construction (avoiding sheer 
historical narrative), offering dialogue in full, using third-person 
point of view, and recording minute details, all in the realist 
tradition of Dickens, Balzac, Fielding, Trollope, and Smollett.106  
Whether this is new is therefore often debated,107 but the 
concern of many journalist critics is that despite the careful and 
extensive research of writers like Wolfe and Capote, they add 
too much to the story.  For example: 
 The mid-1960s brought New Journalism, or at least a new 
label and newfound popularity to an old technique: 
intermingling fact with fiction. . . . Harper’s Magazine tried 
defining New Journalism metaphorically as “somewhere west 
of journalism and this side of history,” the “place where 
reporting becomes literature.”  In this uncharted territory, 
writers embellished quotes, burrowed into characters’ interior 
thoughts, created scenes that may have happened but did not, 
and made up characters who were collages of real people.  
 
3–54, Part II is the anthology edited by Tom Wolfe and E.W. Johnson with select 
work of twenty-three writers, including Norman Mailer, Terry Southern, Gay 
Talese, and Hunter S. Thompson, id. at 55–394. 
103 R.Z. Sheppard, The Haves and the Have-Mores, TIME, Nov. 9, 1987, at 101, 
101 (review of TOM WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES (1987)). 
104 WOLFE, supra note 102, at 9 (ellipsis in original). 
105 Plimpton, The Story Behind a Nonfiction Novel, supra note 15, at 2.  Wolfe 
notes that notwithstanding Capote’s criticism of the New Journalism, “his success 
gave [it] . . . an overwhelming momentum.”  WOLFE, supra note 102, at 26. 
106 WOLFE, supra note 102, at 31–33. 
107 Compare George A. Hough III, How “New”?, in NEW JOURNALISM 16 (M. 
Fishwick ed., 1975); with WEINGARTEN, supra note 18, at 8. 
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Among the leading practitioners were Tom Wolfe, Gay Talese, 
Norman Mailer and Truman Capote.
108
 
Wolfe, conversely, believed that modern journalism bored 
readers “to tears without understanding why. . . . To avoid this I 
would try anything.”109 
When Wolfe wrote his first novel, The Bonfire of the 
Vanities,110 it was not so much a break with New Journalism as 
“an experiment in radically journalistic fiction” that was true to 
the movement; it implied “a claim that all this has been observed 
rather than created.”111  His portrayal of New York society is so 
accurate and devastating112 that: 
[To] call The Bonfire of the Vanities Wolfe’s first novel is to 
make a distinction without too much difference.  The 
ingeniously rigged plot is clearly fictional, but the details of 
New York City life, high and low, leap from the legman’s 
notebook. . . . The crucial change was to make the leading 
character a Wall Street broker . . . . The alteration meant that 
Wolfe had to study the breed in its habitat, to examine its 
plumage, to listen to the roar of “well-educated young white 
men baying for money.”
113
 
To those who might claim Wolfe exaggerates, he replies:  “‘If 
you don’t think this is a correct picture of New York today, then 
do your own reporting.  I say you’ll come back with what I 
did.’”114  Moreover, Wolfe explains, those “things that strike 
people as mockery or hyperbole were, to me, instances of barely 
 
108 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 100, at 211.  Wolfe remarks that his own initial 
reaction to Gay Talese’s Esquire article on Joe Louis, which read like a short story, 
was similar: 
 What the hell is going on? . . . My instinctive, defensive reaction was that 
the man had . . . made up the dialogue . . . maybe he made up whole scenes 
. . . . [T]hat was precisely the reaction that countless journalists and literary 
intellectuals would have over the next nine years as the New Journalism 
picked up momentum. 
WOLFE, supra note 102, at 11. 
109 Id. at 17–18. 
110 WOLFE, supra note 103. 
111 See Richard Vigilante, The Truth About Tom Wolfe, NAT’L REV., Dec. 18, 
1987, at 46, 48 (book review of The Bonfire of the Vanities). 
112 See id. 
113 Sheppard, supra note 103, at 101 (quoting The Bonfire of the Vanities). 
114 Hillary DeVries, The Police Reporter at the Garden Party, CHRISTIAN 
SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 14, 1987, at 6, reprinted in CONVERSATIONS WITH TOM 
WOLFE 241, 243 (Dorothy M. Scura ed., 1990). 
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being able to keep abreast of what was occurring.”115  Even so, 
Wolfe did not claim, as Capote did with respect to In Cold 
Blood, that he intended to write “a book that would read exactly 
like a novel except that every word of it would be absolutely 
true.”116 
B.  Capote and Journalism 
[In Cold Blood] helped show journalists the possibility of using 
creative writing techniques while holding to the guidelines of 
journalism; something now commonly seen . . . [because] many 
view the style as crucial to keeping readers.
117
 
In Cold Blood was the subject of great praise, a “chilling 
masterpiece,” and Capote has been considered a near-genius for 
his “severe control . . . . without morose moralizing,” for 
choosing “precisely the right vocabulary,” for managing the 
horror “without collapsing into bathos,” and for “pioneering . . . 
a new style of novel writing.”118  He was also considered “a 
creative, but still objective reporter” who brought the 
imaginative “techniques of a fiction writer . . . to the cause of his 
reporting.”119  From an ethical perspective, however, two 
concerns persist with respect to In Cold Blood. 
First, and only peripheral to the focus of this Article, is the 
convergence of amoralism, questionable journalistic techniques, 
and personal ambition or careerism within Capote as he 
researched and wrote In Cold Blood.  This convergence is the 
subject of the films Capote and Infamous.120  The “cunning tricks 
 
115 Id. 
116 GROBEL, supra note 11, at 112. 
117 Van Jensen, Writing History:  Capote’s Novel Has a Lasting Effect on 
Journalism, LJWORLD.COM, April 3, 2005, www.2.ljworld.com/news/2005/apr/03/ 
writing_history_capotes. 
118 James A. Michener, Foreword, to GROBEL, supra note 11, at 10. 
119 REED, supra note 8, at 119–20. 
120 Prairie Miller, Infamous:  Truman Capote in Cold Blooded Media Seduction, 
WBAI ARTS MAGAZINE, http://www.wbai.org/index.php?option=com_content& 
task=view&id=9165&itemid=2. 
[T]he most scathing examination of US culture in Infamous, settles on 
issues of ethics versus personal ambition and careerism.  As Capote feigns 
sympathy and a supportive emotional bonding with Smith in the bid of the 
accused man for a life sentence, he harbors at the same time a secret desire 
that Smith be executed as quickly as possible.  Not due to any personal 
belief in the death penalty, but rather in order to provide a potent finale to 
his book in an impatient bid for a bestseller. 
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Truman Capote used to obtain the information he needed” has 
been called the second crime in In Cold Blood,121 and Capote’s 
alleged remark, that he could “hardly wait” until “they’re 
executed” so that the book could be published, is 
unforgettable.122  For some journalists, such behavior exemplifies 
the failure of journalistic ethics: 
If there is a scandal in the making of the best-selling non-
fiction book of 1966, it’s not about the facts contained in the 
368 pages of Truman Capote’s In Cold Blood.  Virtually every 
detail about the brutal murder of the Clutter family has stood 
up to forty years of scrutiny.  When it comes to Capote, the 
devil is not in the details; it’s in how he got to those details in 
the first place.
123
 
Others, however, are less comfortable with the accuracy of 
Capote’s “details,” and for them the scandal of Capote’s 
unscrupulousness should not eclipse the second ethical 
controversy, namely the scandal of the fictional aspects of In 
Cold Blood. 
Before turning to the problem of accuracy in Capote’s 
storytelling techniques and its parallel in trial advocacy, it bears 
mention that the notion of unethically betraying an informant’s 
trust, in journalism, has a parallel in the professional regulation 
of conflicts of interests for lawyers.  Consider that Capote is 
virtually blamed for the duplicity of contemporary “true crime” 
authors124–for example, convicted murderer Jeffrey MacDonald 
claimed that Joe McGinnis “inveigled his way into 
[MacDonald’s] confidence, gaining unique access to his personal 
 
Id.; see also Kermode, supra note 1. 
[In the film Capote,] Capote’s relationship with murderer Perry Smith is 
depicted in all of self-serving strangeness, with the writer first falling in love 
with his subject . . . then later abandoning him and longing for his execution 
in order that he may finish his wretched book. 
 In one key scene, Capote is seen lying to Smith about the title of his 
magnum opus, claiming that In Cold Blood is just a publisher’s puff. 
Id. 
121 Emmanuel Burdeau, The Writing of Crimes, CAHIERS DU CINÉMA, (Sally 
Shafto trans.), March 2006, http://www.cahiersducinema.com/article695.html. 
122 PLIMPTON, supra note 3, at 215 (quoting Ned Rorem who heard Capote say, 
“it can’t be published until they’re executed, so I can hardly wait”). 
123 Klein, supra note 7. 
124 See, for example, Kermode, supra note 1, with the title:  Truman Capote, 
You’ve Got a Lot to Answer for and Klein, supra note 7, who states that Capote, the 
film, represents “the beginning of the end, the top of that slippery slope down which 
the profession of journalism has slid.”  Id. 
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life under the guise of writing a sympathetic account of his 
innocence, while, in fact, penning a damning indictment of his 
guilt.”125  The ethical dilemma of author-lawyers who become 
“true crime” reporters of their client’s experiences in court arises 
from the same risk of duplicity.  Rule 1.8 of the ABA Model 
Rules prohibits negotiation, prior to the conclusion of 
representation, of “an agreement giving the lawyer literary or 
media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial part 
on information relating to the representation.”126  The comments 
to that rule confirm the “conflict between the interests of the 
client and the personal interests of the lawyer,” and that those 
actions “suitable in the representation of the client may detract 
from the publication value of an account of the 
representation.”127  While unethical journalists have to work to 
gain a subject’s trust before obtaining access to materials that 
they could use to betray their subject, attorneys have ready-
made access due to the trust that characterizes attorney-client 
relations.  The idea that an attorney may refrain from taking 
actions that would benefit a client, in order to make the lawyer’s 
forthcoming book more exciting, is actually illustrated by the 
accusation that the wealthy Capote had the resources to help 
Smith and Hickock by providing them better counsel–“$50,000 
might have saved them . . . only the poor must hang”–but he did 
not in order to speed both their execution and completion of the 
book.128  That said, the more striking parallel between Capote’s 
construction of In Cold Blood and the ethical obligations of 
lawyers lies in the nature of nonfiction storytelling techniques. 
As depicted in the film Capote, Truman Capote was famous 
(or infamous) for his claim that he could “transcribe 
conversation without using a tape recorder . . . . I could get 
within 95 percent of absolute accuracy, which is as close as you 
need.”129  When challenged concerning the accuracy of the 
details in In Cold Blood, Capote replied:  “One doesn’t spend 
almost six years on a book, the point of which is factual accuracy, 
and then give way to minor distortions.  People are so  
 
125 Kermode, supra note 1 (including other examples of authors who owe a debt 
to In Cold Blood). 
126 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(d) (2002, as amended, 2003). 
127 Id. cmt. 9. 
128 PLIMPTON, TRUMAN CAPOTE, supra note 3, at 215 (quoting Ned Rorem). 
129 Id. at 202 (quoting Capote in an interview). 
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suspicious. . . . All of [In Cold Blood] is reconstructed from the 
evidence of witnesses . . . .”130 
Even biographer and apologist Kenneth Reed was not 
disturbed by the charges that Capote blended fact and fiction: 
Capote had managed to orchestrate the story of the Clutter 
murders, not through the distortion of fact, but by the 
reordering and proportioning of it. . . . [W]hile the reader can 
depend upon the high degree of accuracy in Capote’s 
documentation, it should be borne in mind that the selectivity 
of detail and the particular points singled out for emphasis are 
elements left to the discretion of the artist himself.
131
 
But that is not the end of the story.  Contemporary assessments 
typically concede that: 
Capote blurred the line between truth and untruth, despite his 
claims of impeccable accuracy.  His embellishments–which 
vary from allegedly misquoting people to making composite 
characters to ending the book with a scene that never 
happened–have bred ill will from some in the book who felt 
falsely portrayed and distrust from readers who, upon learning 
of Capote’s changes, are left to wonder where reality ends and 
fiction begins.
132
 
It was Phillip K. Tompkins’ 1966 Esquire article, entitled In Cold 
Fact, that catalogued Capote’s inaccuracies133 and caused some 
readers, who “would have had no problems . . . if Capote had not 
claimed that he never strayed from the truth,” to “wonder 
whether any of the inconsistencies are important.”134  And Bill 
Brown, the former editor of the Garden City Telegram who was 
“enlisted to help [Capote] track down interview sources,”135 
“thought that Capote’s portrayal of the Clutter[] [family] was so 
off the mark as to be virtually unrecognizable.”136 
Numerous individuals portrayed in In Cold Blood have 
questioned Capote’s recollections of their meetings with the 
author.137  Duane West, the lead prosecutor who tried the 
 
130 Id. at 207–08. 
131 REED, supra note 8, at 112. 
132 Jensen, supra note 117. 
133 Phillip K. Tompkins, In Cold Fact, ESQUIRE, June 1966, at 125. 
134 Esther G. Spurrill, Truth, Better Than Fiction:  How “In Cold Fact” by Phillip 
K. Tompkins Changed My Opinion of In Cold Blood by Truman Capote, 
AUTHORSDEN, Feb. 23, 2002, http://authorsden.com/visit/viewarticle.asp?id=4155. 
135 WEINGARTEN, supra note 18, at 31. 
136 Id. at 34. 
137 See generally Tompkins, supra note 133. 
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Clutter case, later complained that he had been portrayed 
unjustly and “grievously underrepresented” in In Cold Blood.138  
Logan Green is presented as responsible for the convictions, and 
West appears to be “playing second fiddle.”139  West said: 
I’ve heard various people say that Truman didn’t quote them 
correctly. . . . I know he mistakenly described my part in the 
book. . . . I handled all the investigation, worked with the 
investigators, prepared the trial brief, handled all the evidence 
. . . . Mr. Green was hired to assist me . . . . I made the opening 
statement to the jury.  Truman took part of what I said and 
attributed it to Mr. Green. . . . This business of a new art 
form–“nonfiction novel”–is a bunch of garbage.140 
Similar complaints were made by Kansas Bureau of 
Investigation agent Harold Nye.141  Capote sent some galleys 
from In Cold Blood for approval, but Nye called the work “a 
fiction thing,” and refused to approve the galleys because 
Capote “didn’t tell the truth.”142 
What he did was to take this lady who ran the little apartment 
house . . . where Perry Smith had been, and fictionalize her 
way out of character.  Accuracy was not his point. . . . I was 
under the impression that the book was going to be factual, 
and it . . . was a fiction book.
143
 
Even as Capote was being accused of taking “the latitude of 
the fiction writer,” a technique he associated with the 
“documentary novel–a popular and interesting but impure 
genre,” he insisted that his “nonfiction novel” had the distinction 
of combining “the persuasiveness of fact” with “the poetic 
attitude fiction is capable of reaching.”144 
Trial lawyers, in their opening and closing statements, are 
storytellers who likewise hope to combine persuasive facts with 
compelling narrative techniques.  Moreover, as advocates, they 
need not pretend to be completely objective, which suggests a 
parallel with New Journalists and even Capote (whose claims of 
 
138 Patrick Smith, An Outspoken Critic:  Former Prosecutor Says Capote 
Misrepresented Him, LJWORLD.COM, April 5, 2005, http://www2.ljworld.com/news/ 
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139 Id. 
140 PLIMPTON, TRUMAN CAPOTE, supra note 3, at 221–22 (quoting Duane West). 
141 Id. at 175. 
142 Id. (quoting Harold Nye). 
143 Id. (quoting Harold Nye). 
144 Plimpton, The Story Behind a Nonfiction Novel, supra note 15, at 3 (stating 
that the documentary novelist “lets his imagination run riot over the facts”). 
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objectivity145 are belied by his seeming, perhaps unconscious, 
advocacy for the murderers).  “While the New Journalists are 
not the first to recognize the difficulty of being ‘objective,’ they 
do articulate the problem more zealously than their 
predecessors.  They question what constitutes objectivity and 
whether it is even desirable.  Their criticism essentially focuses 
on . . . time-honored assumptions underlying traditional 
journalism.”146  For example, New Journalists view “neutrality as 
an impotent response to social problems,” and believe that the 
attempt to be detached and impersonal “leads to sterile, 
meaningless, and often misleading journalism.”147  In short, the 
“canons of objectivity . . . function to insulate the truth.”148  The 
contrast of truth with objectivity is evocative of the role of legal 
advocates, where objectivity is excused but where truth becomes 
the ethical limit on advocacy. 
C.  The Ethics of Opening and Closing Statements 
 [Capote:]  What I think is that reporting can be made as 
interesting as fiction, and done as artistically . . . . 
 . . . . 
 [Plimpton:] . . . I suppose the temptation to fictionalize 
events, or a line of dialogue, . . . must be at times 
overwhelming.  With “In Cold Blood” was there any invention 
of this sort to speak of–I was thinking specifically of the dog 
you described trotting along the road . . . [and] Dick [Hickock, 
when on the run with Perry Smith,] swerving to hit the dog.  
Was there actually a dog at that exact point in the narrative, or 
were you using . . .  a fiction device . . . ? 
 [Capote:]  No.  There was a dog, and it was precisely as 
described.149 
If the goal of the nonfiction novel is to both (i) maintain 
journalistic accuracy (avoiding the distortion of facts) and (ii) to 
create a work of art by “reordering” and “proportioning” the 
facts (selecting the right details and singling out “the particular 
points . . . for emphasis”), then the genre is familiar ground for 
 
145 See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text. 
146 Richard A. Kallan, Entrance, in NEW JOURNALISM, supra note 107, at 8, 9. 
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320 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86, 295 
trial attorneys.150  Law libraries are the repositories for hundreds 
of books on the art of advocacy, and few do not extol the virtues 
of storytelling techniques.  “After all, what is a trial?  It is two 
parties, each telling its story and asking society to endorse its 
version of reality. . . . Through the construction of stories jurors 
can organize and analyze the vast amount of information 
involved in making legal judgments.”151  Story construction has 
been called “framing” of ambiguous material in a competition 
over authority,152 and while good lawyers attend to the evidence 
and the law: 
[T]hey reach beyond these givens to the circumstances . . . to 
plotlines already deeply embedded in listeners’ minds, to 
mythic narratives whose familiar moves reveal how the world 
is and how people . . . act . . . . This larger meaning is crucial to 
the story’s effectiveness as a means of persuasion, a rhetorical 
device.
153
 
Thus a “trial needs a storyline,”154 and a good story needs 
imagery and detail (“it is not enough to lay out simple facts”),155 
personal involvement (“you are not there to offer 
objectivity”),156 a story arc (to “cause the story to move 
forward”),157 character development,158 and genuine drama.159 
The key to motivating the jury . . . is to create the story that 
does, indeed, involve the jury in the life of the main    
character. . . . [C]reate the story . . . and . . . focus the juror’s 
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point of view from the perspective of your client . . . . Stories 
de-emphasize the logical and resurrect the emotion and the 
intuition. . . .  And of course, jurors . . . are drawn to a good 
drama . . . .
160
 
These and similar guidelines combine to suggest not simply that 
lawyers “win with stories,” but that they win with carefully 
constructed stories that begin with a “hook,” arouse curiosity, 
set the scene, develop strong characters, and present a 
compelling plot.161 
Such advice puts trial lawyers in a position that is not unlike 
Capote’s when writing In Cold Blood.  If we assume that Capote 
failed in his goal to remain detached and avoid judgment, by 
directing sympathy toward the defendants and impliedly 
suggesting a miscarriage of justice, then he became an advocate 
and even more like a lawyer.  But in shaping details and 
imposing structure or proportion, he seems to have failed to 
offer a “true account.”  Critics who discovered inaccuracies were 
not inclined to respond that Capote’s account was one of several 
“true” accounts; they simply judged the work as a blend of fact 
and fiction.  Perhaps that is why U.S. District Court Judge 
William G. Young resists the notion that a trial is a contest of 
stories:  if an attorney says, “[opposing counsel] didn’t tell . . . the 
other side to the story,” such a statement suggests that there are 
two versions of reality from which the jury should choose one.162  
We should never, Judge Young explains, suggest that we are 
telling a story;163 what we are offering, echoing Capote, is a “true 
account.”  And if the New Journalists are right, then we should 
not adopt the traditional (boring) journalist’s stance, which can 
insulate the truth, but that of the fiction writer.164  Hence, the 
advice that opening statements must be dramatic (drama, since 
“it appeals to emotion it permits argument to enter the minds of 
the jurors without . . . proof”),165 and that lawyers should use 
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storytelling techniques such as parallel stories,166 the creation of 
atmosphere, and introducing characters.167 
In the background to all of this, Rule 3.3 of the ABA Model 
Rules provides that, “[a] lawyer shall not knowingly make a false 
statement of fact . . . to a tribunal,”168 and Rule 3.4 prohibits 
alluding “to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably 
believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible 
evidence.”169  Lawyers are expected to present a “client’s case 
with persuasive force,” and while they are “not required to 
present an impartial exposition of the law . . . [they] must not 
allow the tribunal to be misled by false statements of . . . fact.”170  
Most of the trial advocacy manuals discussing effective opening 
and closing arguments do not refer to the above ethical 
requirement, and if they do, it is only to make the point that 
lawyers are not allowed to fabricate, exaggerate, or misstate 
facts.171  It is almost too obvious to merit discussion:  lawyers are 
not allowed to lie.  Lawyers are permitted to choose, creatively, 
the facts that they want to reveal, but they are not allowed to 
change the facts as they know them. 
Steven Lubet, in Modern Trial Advocacy, discusses 
storytelling and asks how much room there is for creative theory 
choice for lawyers who are bound to be truthful.172  He offers the 
example of telling a story without mentioning the facts that 
could damage a client’s claim or defense, but not going so far as 
to deny those facts.173  More importantly, however, Lubet points 
out that the known facts in any legal dispute often support 
several different interpretations or stories:  “Our ultimate stories 
might be ineffective, or even foolish, but they are ethical so long 
as they are not built on a false foundation.”174  Moreover, we are 
entitled to resolve doubts in favor of our clients, and “since 
seldom will the facts be undisputed or capable of but a single 
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interpretation,” there is room for conflicting stories in the 
courtroom, where neither attorney is “lying” about the facts.175 
One of the most thoughtful, though ultimately inconclusive, 
reflections on the ethical limits of storytelling is nonlawyer Sam 
Schrager’s The Trial Lawyer’s Art.176  The craft of storytelling, 
for Schrager, is the trial lawyer’s art, and he rejects the notion 
that “trials are a rational search for truth” as a “grand 
oversimplification.”177  Our adversarial system “requires lawyers 
to show zealous allegiance to their side’s version of truth,” which 
forces lawyers “to create the appearance of truth.”178  Despite 
our “official rhetoric about truth and justice,” lawyers “act as if 
no matter what may actually have happened . . . , the evidence is 
by its very nature inconclusive.  They talk [among themselves] as 
if the outcome of a case may be decided more by the skill they 
muster than by the evidence . . . .”179  “Lawyers shrewdly 
orchestrate myriad elements to make a convincing story,”180 
Schrager’s ethnographic study reveals, and in a trial: 
[E]ach lawyer tries to move jurors towards his or her framing 
of the story by setting them up for successive revelations, 
moments that lead to recognitions.  At these moments 
dispassion gives way to feeling; feeling, perhaps, to new 
understanding . . . . The opposing lawyers’ use of . . . dramatic 
effects [such as emplotment] pulls the jurors in opposite 
directions.
181
 
In terms of style, the use of parallelisms,182 set-pieces,183 and 
metaphors184 helps “create a multilayered consistency of 
appearances, a complex redundancy that will withstand jurors’ 
scrutiny so that wherever they turn, they will find confirmations 
of soundness to earn their trust.”185 
But what about the potential of deceiving juries? 
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The craft, which brings you near the truth, also exiles you from 
it.  How do lawyers deal with this paradox? . . . [They are 
uneasy] about their ambiguous role in the search for justice.  
Could it be that the need to mislead in the service of client or 
cause–to create appearances along that slippery slope that 
runs from shading to distortion to lies–disturbs them?186 
Schrager, intent on neither skewering nor apologizing for the 
lawyer’s craft, finds “the supreme irony for trial lawyers” to be 
that “[t]hey must play their role to the hilt–even at their soul’s 
peril.”187 
In the concluding chapter of his study, Schrager justifies the 
lawyer’s art as arising from our commitment “to trial by jury.”188  
The self-limitations on storytelling may be pragmatic (integrity 
helps one to be more persuasive), a matter of personal 
conscience (though “self-examination is constrained by the 
demands of practice”), or simply shaped by professional 
socialization.189  And there are moral reasons to engage in 
extreme advocacy, such as the belief in equality and that justice 
has the best chance with evenly matched lawyers.190 
Maybe you pull out the stops because the other side does, or 
because the odds are stacked against you, or because . . . you 
leave nothing to chance.  You’re driven to do it.  If you get 
squeamish, if ethical doubts cause you to hesitate, you are 
liable to weaken your performance in the heat of battle.
191
 
Schrager, seeing so much good in adversarial lawyers and the 
jury system, withholds judgment–he’s not dealing with the 
“official view” of the lawyer’s role or “those concerned about 
lawyers’ ethics.”192  And after all, are lawyers “less moral than 
journalists,” who criticize trial lawyers who are “easy targets?”193  
“It would be better for journalists to look self-critically at how 
well they . . . live up to their public trust to investigate and report 
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what they find.”194  The scandal that Schrager seems to disclose is 
thereby transposed onto another profession. 
Returning to the perceived depths to which some overly 
ambitious and discredited journalists go to tell a good story, we 
are not always forgiving; we condemn Judith Miller, Jayson 
Blair, and Stephen Glass.195  As to Capote, one might be 
selective in evaluating the inaccurate details that he added to In 
Cold Blood in order to round out the narrative: 
 The inconsistency that bothered me most was Capote’s 
characterization of Perry Smith . . . [as] articulate and 
intelligent . . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . Perry was not the grammar genius Capote seems to want 
us to believe he was. . . . 
 Before [realizing this,] I felt sorry for Perry . . . . 
 . . . . 
 I do not really care about some things that Capote 
fabricated; for example, the last scene in the book, the meeting 
in the cemetery between the detective Dewey and Nancy’s best 
friend Sue Kidwell.
196
 
But we would likely care if a lawyer fabricated some things to 
help the structure of a client’s story.  Even if such a fabrication 
was more justified than a journalist’s (who holds the public 
trust), on the basis of an adversarial system of justice and a 
moral commitment to trial by jury, our professional regulations 
draw the line at known falsehoods.  All of the shaping, artistry, 
structure, order, coherence, style, and other techniques of fiction 
must, from the perspective of our formal ethical system, defer to 
that standard.  When Schrager talks about the “uncertainties 
about where, when, how, and why to draw the line–qualms that 
have to be repressed for effective performance”197–he is 
expressing doubts about whether the formal rules of legal ethics 
should not, perhaps, give way to deeper moral commitments to 
fairness and equality.  And while he would not likely claim that 
aesthetic structure or style is a goal in itself, he links the moral 
aspects or our legal system to the craft of storytelling, that is, to 
the lawyer’s art. 
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Capote claimed no moral or message for In Cold Blood, 
except that he vowed to tell the truth.  In Schrager’s perspective, 
the lawyer’s vow is to tell a good story, with a clear message that 
his or her client should win.  Neither model fits the rules of 
professional conduct, which takes more seriously than either 
Capote or Schrager the commitment to avoid fabrication, but 
otherwise acknowledges the advocate’s duty to tell a compelling 
story. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The drama comes, if you will, from the events themselves.  
Don’t dramatize . . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . [T]his isn’t a story; this is all reality. . . . 
 As a trial lawyer, you want to convey by every statement . . . 
there’s only one version–strike that.  “Version” is even 
wrong–there’s only one truth, and you’re telling the truth, not 
the other side [of the story] . . . .
198
 
The task, from a craft perspective, is, in a strict sense of the 
word, fictive:  an elaborate fabrication of meaning for an 
audience.  Thus lawyers’ work is allied with that of novelists, 
actors, directors . . . all fabulists . . . .
199
 
The differences in such aphorisms might be explained away by 
their sources:  the first quote by a federal trial judge, the second 
by an ethnographer (of the subculture of trial lawyers) who is 
not a lawyer.  The first is perhaps overly idealistic, the second 
perhaps too realistic.  But the tension is familiar, as in the ethical 
duties to be both a zealous advocate and an honest officer of the 
court.  One has to find a way to be, and a way to talk about how 
to be, both; otherwise the “lawyer’s craft” becomes a dirty little 
secret that is only revealed by ethnographers. 
Lawyers, as advocates, rely on client narratives, resolve 
doubts in favor of their client, identify with their clients, and 
develop a theory of the case that drives their production of a 
coherent story.  But as they manipulate facts, characterize and 
personalize their clients, add dramatic elements, advance a plot, 
and structure their narrative for effect, they are doing exactly 
what Capote did in In Cold Blood, and therefore, face the same 
temptations (to fictionalize) that he did.  The ethical goal for 
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lawyers is to avoid, during the storytelling process, crossing the 
line into fiction. 
To the extent that lawyers are storytellers, In Cold Blood is 
perhaps a warning about the limits of drama, emplotment, and 
identification with one’s client.  Moreover, whether fact or 
fiction, the representation of lawyers in In Cold Blood provides 
points of reflection on the role of prosecutors and defense 
counsel in criminal trials.  The way in which the prosecution 
dealt with the insanity defense, and the questions about the 
competence of that defense, and conflicts of interest affecting 
the defense attorneys provide heuristic images of ethical 
misconduct for law students and lawyers.  Thus, the year of 
Capote was a good one for law and literature studies and for the 
legal profession’s perennial need to reaffirm the ethical aspects 
of advocacy. 
 
 
 
 
